Defendant's Ability to Obtain Plaintiff's Complete Medical History -

New York

What limitations exist, if any, on a defendant’s ability to obtain a plaintiff’s complete medical history, both pre and post incident?

Under New York law, a defendant is entitled to disclosure of “all matter material and necessary” to the defense of an action. CPLR 3101(a); Rivera v. NYP Holdings Inc., 881 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (1st Dept. 2009); Friel v. Papa, 869 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (2nd Dept. 2008). This requires “disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity.” D’Alessandro v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 29 N.Y.S.3d 382, 383–84 (2nd Dept. 2016); U.S. Ice Cream Corp. v. Carvel Corp., 593 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (2nd Dept. 1993). Specifically, a plaintiff’s relevant medical information is necessary and material to the defense of an action. Pizzo v. Bunora, 454 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (2nd Dept. 1982); Moore v. Gemerek, 635 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (4th Dept.1995).

A defendant’s ability to obtain a plaintiff’s complete pre and post incident medical history is typically limited to information regarding the medical condition the plaintiff has placed in controversy, to the extent that such information is related to the plaintiff’s claim. Daniele v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 425 N.Y.S.2d 363, 363 (2nd Dept. 1980); Ellerin v. Bentley’s, 698 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (2nd Dept. 1999). A plaintiff places their entire medical condition in controversy when they assert broad allegations of physical injury and mental anguish. Diamond v. Ross Orthopedic Grp., P.C., 839 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (2nd Dept. 2007); Abdalla v. Mazl Taxi, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (2nd Dept. 2009); Avila v. 106 Corona Realty Corp., 750 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (2nd Dept. 2002). A defendant is usually entitled to records that “would result in the discovery of admissible or relevant evidence.” DeStrange v. Lind, 716 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (2nd Dept. 2000). Notably, the trial court is afforded a great amount of deference on the issue of disclosure, therefore their decisions will ordinarily not be disrupted “absent an improvident exercise of that discretion.” Spodek v. Neiss, 892 N.Y.S.2d 914 (2nd Dept. 2010); Reilly Green Mountain Platform Tennis v. Cortese, 873 N.Y.S.2d 494-95 (2nd Dept. 2009); See Cabellero v. City of New York, 853 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (2nd Dept. 2008).

Ultimately, caselaw suggests that if a defendant presents a reasonable argument that the information sought would yield relevant or admissible evidence with respect to the medical condition(s) in controversy, they may be entitled to such information. For example, a defendant can obtain information about “the nature and severity of the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions [which] may have an impact upon the amount of damages, if any, recoverable for a claim of loss of enjoyment of life” M.C. v. Sylvia Marsh Equities, Inc., 959 N.Y.S.2d 280, 283 (2nd Dept. 2013); See Amoroso v. City of New York, 887 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (2nd Dept. 2009). Finally, the party seeking the medical records bears the burden of demonstrating that the other party’s mental or physical condition was placed into controversy. Budano v. Gurdon, 948 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (1st Dept. 2012).