Chapter Objectives
After completing this chapter, the reader should be able to:
- State the two-part test a court uses to decide whether a mobile application is a “product” for product-liability purposes.
- Distinguish a defect in the application itself from a complaint about the platform’s service or business model — the line on which these cases turn.
- Identify the two exceptions that can impose a duty to guard against third-party criminal acts.
- Place the leading decisions on a spectrum from “app-is-a-product” to “app-is-a-service,” and recognize that the law is unsettled.
- The Core Question
Traditional product-liability law applies to tangible items placed in the stream of commerce. Mobile platform applications — rideshare, delivery, social media, dating — are intangible. The unsettled question is whether, and when, the application itself can be treated as a “product” subject to strict liability and negligent-design claims, rather than as a non-tangible “service” outside product-liability law.
Two distinct issues recur and must be kept separate: (1) the product question — is the app a product? — and (2) the duty question — does the platform owe a duty to protect users or drivers from the criminal acts of third parties? A given case may resolve one and not the other.
- Anchor Authority: Ameer v. Lyft, Inc.
Citation: Ameer v. Lyft, Inc., No. ED112455 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Mar. 4, 2025) (issue of first impression in Missouri).
2.1 Operative Facts
- Andrew Ameer, a Lyft driver, accepted a ride request and was killed in a carjacking in the City of St. Louis (September 2020).
- The ride was requested by two minors who set up an account using a false name, false email address, and an anonymous form of payment.
- The decedent’s mother, Rochelle Ameer, sued Lyft on three product-liability counts (strict-liability defective design, negligent design, negligent failure to warn) and two negligence counts (negligent training, general negligence).
- Core defect theory: the app lacked identity, age, and GPS verification and data-pattern analysis that would have screened out the fraudulent request. Note the framing — it sits on the line between “defect in the app” and “how Lyft screens passengers.”
2.2 Procedural Posture
- Lyft moved to dismiss, arguing (a) the app is a service, not a product; and (b) Lyft is not a common carrier and owed no duty to protect against third-party crime, which it argued was not foreseeable.
- The circuit court dismissed all five counts: the app is intangible and therefore not a product, and the criminal act was not reasonably foreseeable (a “high-crime area” alone being insufficient).
- The Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reviewed de novo and reversed on both grounds, reinstating the claims and remanding.
2.3 Holding on the Product Question — the Two-Part Test
The court announced a new test for whether a mobile ridesharing application is a product:
The Ameer Two-Part Test
- Sufficient similarity. A mobile ridesharing application is a product if the alleged facts establish that the application has sufficient similarities to a tangible product.
- Defect in the app itself. To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege that the harm resulted from a defect in the application itself — in its design or functionality — and not from problems with the developer’s services or broader business model.
The majority held the petition adequately alleged both elements. The court reasoned that Lyft designed the app and placed it into the stream of commerce, putting Lyft in the best position to control the design-related risk — analogous to the designer of a defective tangible product.
2.4 Holding on the Duty Question
The court recognized two exceptions to the general rule that a defendant has no duty to protect against the criminal acts of third parties. On the allegations taken as true:
- Superior position to anticipate the harm. Lyft was better positioned than the driver to anticipate and guard against the risk.
- Low burden of precaution. Implementing protective measures would not have been unduly burdensome — particularly where the petition alleged Lyft already required additional verification for anonymous payment in other states.
The TNC statute precluded common-carrier status, but the court located the duty in these general negligence exceptions rather than in carrier law.
2.5 The Dissent — the Defense Roadmap
Why the split matters
The panel was unanimous in adopting the two-part test but split on whether the petition satisfied it; the reversal on the product counts was therefore by majority, not unanimous.
The dissent concurred in the test but would have affirmed dismissal. Its position: the allegations — failure to screen and verify passengers — describe Lyft’s business model and how it delivers its ridesharing service, not a defect in the application itself, and so fail the second prong. This is the analytical fault line on which the defense of these cases turns.
- National Survey — The Product Question
Courts split on whether platform applications are products. The trend is toward allowing the theory to survive a motion to dismiss, but it is neither uniform nor settled.
| Decision | Posture | Holding / Point |
| Ameer v. Lyft (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) | App may be product | Adopted the two-part test; app can be a product where the defect lies in the app’s design/functionality. Issue of first impression in Missouri. |
| Doe v. Lyft, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (D. Kan. 2024) | App may be product | Driver-assault case; defect theory that the app failed to match the driver’s submitted photo to the license photo. Rejected the “all-or-nothing” service/product framing. Relied on by the Ameer majority. |
| In re Uber Techs. Passenger Sexual Assault Litig., 745 F. Supp. 3d 869 (N.D. Cal. 2024) | App may be product | Applying CA/TX law; Restatement (Third) commentary suggests software should be treated as a product when mass-produced rather than custom-made. Product claims not dismissable on the ground that the app is not a product. |
| Brookes v. Lyft, Inc., 2022 WL 19799628 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2022) | App may be product | Design choices in the app (e.g., the 15-second response pressure) alleged to cause harm; product framework permitted. Later cited in the social-media addiction MDL. |
| In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction Litig., 702 F. Supp. 3d 809 (N.D. Cal. 2023) | Trend / mixed | Engaged the question whether service applications may be products; part of the broader expansion of product theories to platforms. |
| Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber Techs., Inc., 79 Cal. App. 5th 410 (2022) | No duty (see §4) | Caution: this is a duty-of-care holding, not a product holding. The trial court held the Uber app was not a product (2020 WL 13801354), but the Court of Appeal affirmed on other grounds — the duty ground below. Do not cite it as anti-product authority. |
Counter-trend, accurately stated. Outside the rideshare context, many courts have held platforms are not products: e.g., addictive online games, social-media platforms, and instant-messaging apps have been held non-products. The point for the product question is that authority cuts both ways and remains in early development.
- The Duty Question — Third-Party Criminal Acts
Separate from whether the app is a product is whether the platform owes any duty to protect against third-party crime. Here the leading authority cuts against plaintiffs.
- Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber Techs., Inc., 79 Cal. App. 5th 410 (2022): Uber owed no duty to assault victims because the plaintiffs did not allege acts by Uber that created an unreasonable risk of harm. The court applied a “necessary component” test — the violence (abduction and rape) was not a necessary component of the Uber business model, so no duty attached. A federal panel later predicted the California Supreme Court might not follow it, underscoring the instability.
- Ameer reached the opposite result on duty by routing around common-carrier law and applying the superior-position and low-burden exceptions (§2.4).
- Illinois, Washington, and Texas courts have grappled with the same duty question, with outcomes varying by the nature of the platform-user relationship and the degree of control alleged.
- Quijano v. Postmates, Inc., the Los Angeles County Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendant because it did not owe a duty to plaintiff. No. 21STCV10542, 2024 LEXIS 57262, at *7-8 (Cal. Super. May 29, 2024).
Quijano was an action where the plaintiff admittedly and intentionally misrepresented his identity by using the credentials of another person to create an account on the defendant’s platform for delivery services. Id. at *1-2. The defendant argued that it did not have a duty to “control, delegate, hire entrust, train, protect and supervise” because the plaintiff was neither an employee, nor an independent contractor and the plaintiff only gained access to the platform using someone else’s information to create a delivery account with the defendant. Id. at *7. Further, the evidence established that defendant did not have any knowledge of the plaintiff because the defendant did not know that the plaintiff posed as someone else to create the fictitious account. Id. This was sufficient evidence to shift the burden to plaintiff as to whether a duty was owed to plaintiff and ultimately, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there was any “special relationship” for the defendant’s purported “control” over its couriers because foundationally, the plaintiff was not a driver for the defendant. Id. at *7-8
Insight: the product question and the duty question can move in opposite directions. A plaintiff can clear the product hurdle and still lose on duty, and vice versa. Brief and analyze them separately.
- State of the Law — Unsettled
- No Missouri court has yet interpreted or applied the Ameer two-part test. As an issue of first impression, it may draw Missouri Supreme Court review.
- Ameer has begun to influence other courts. In Newman v. Lyft, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218111, a court declined to find product-liability claims futile on a motion for leave to amend, citing Ameer.
- Authority is thin, recent, and conflicting. The product/service boundary for platform applications is genuinely open, and the analysis is fact-intensive at the pleading stage.
- Practice Notes — Defense and Coverage
Defending the product claim
- Win on prong two. The defensible line is the Ameer dissent: characterize the allegations as complaints about the platform’s service, screening, or business model rather than a defect in the app’s design or functionality. Develop the record so the “defect” collapses into “how the company operates.”
- Attack “sufficient similarity” on the facts. Prong one is fact-dependent. Where the plaintiff cannot tie the harm to a discrete design feature, the analogy to a tangible product weakens.
- Preserve the TNC-statute argument. Even where it does not defeat duty, the statute frames the platform as a service and supports the service characterization on the product question.
Defending the duty claim
- Foreseeability and burden. Contest both exceptions: that the platform was not better positioned to anticipate the specific criminal act, and that the proposed precaution was in fact burdensome or speculative.
- Use the necessary-component framing. Where applicable, argue the criminal act was not a necessary component of the platform’s model (cf. Jane Doe No. 1).
Coverage and carrier implications
- Design-defect and failure-to-warn theories against a software platform raise occurrence, intentional-acts, and professional-services questions that differ from ordinary auto or premises claims — evaluate the policy form against a product-liability, not a service, theory.
- Exposure scales: a design-defect ruling against an app implicates every ride, not a single incident. Reserve and resolution strategy should account for the aggregation risk these theories create.
- Review Questions
- State the two prongs of the Ameer Which prong does the dissent contend the plaintiff failed, and why?
- A plaintiff alleges a rideshare app should have required passenger ID verification. Is that a defect in the app or a feature of the service? How would each side frame it?
- Identify the two exceptions to the no-duty rule for third-party criminal acts applied in Ameer, and the test the Jane Doe No. 1 court used to reach the opposite result.
- Why is it an error to cite Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber as authority that a rideshare app is not a product?
Key Authorities
Ameer v. Lyft, Inc., No. ED112455 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Mar. 4, 2025).
Doe v. Lyft, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (D. Kan. 2024).
In re Uber Techs., Inc., Passenger Sexual Assault Litig., 745 F. Supp. 3d 869 (N.D. Cal. 2024).
Brookes v. Lyft, Inc., 2022 WL 19799628 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2022).
In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Personal Injury Prods. Liab. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 3d 809 (N.D. Cal. 2023).
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber Techs., Inc., 79 Cal. App. 5th 410 (2022) (duty).
Newman v. Lyft, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218111.
Drafting note: verify the pincites for the In re Uber, In re Social Media, and Newman entries against the reporter before publication.